This paper focuses on the role of real exchange rate volatility as a driver of portfolio home bias, and in particular as an explanation for differences in home bias across financial assets. We present a Markowitz-type portfolio selection model in which real exchange rate volatility induces a bias towards domestic financial assets as well as a stronger home bias for assets with low local currency return volatility. We find empirical support in favour of this hypothesis for a broad set of industrialised and emerging market countries. Not only is real exchange rate volatility an important factor behind bilateral portfolio home bias, but we find that a reduction of monthly real exchange rate volatility from its sample mean to zero reduces bond home bias by up to 60 percentage points, while it reduces equity home bias by only 20 percentage points. JEL No.: F30, F31, G11, G15
Introduction
Home bias towards holding domestic financial assets continues to be an important phenomenon of global financial markets which is poorly understood. At least since French and Poterba (1991) the fact that investors reveal a strong preference for their home countries' equity is known as home bias. A steadily growing literature has proposed several partly competing and partly complementary explanations. An important strand of this literature focuses on the effect of transaction and information costs on international portfolio positions, as for example in Stulz (1981) , Gehrig (1993) , Cai and Warnock (2004) and Portes and Rey (2005) . Various recent empirical studies have challenged in particular the assumption that international diversification yields higher returns. They indeed find that investors frequently earn significantly higher returns on investments in firms that are located in close geographic proximity, due to information asymmetries and frictions (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) , Hau (2001) , Choe, Khoe and Stulz 2004 , Dvorak 2005 , Bae, Stulz and Tan (2005 ).
Other studies emphasise the role of policies and of the quality of domestic institutions, such as capital controls or corporate governance, in explaining cross-country differences in financial asset holdings (e.g. Black (1974) , Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) , Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2002) , Burger and Warnock (2003, 2004) , Gelos and Wei (2005) ). A more recent strand of the literature has proposed behavioural explanations such as patriotism (Morse and Shrive (2004) ) or investors who maximise expected wealth relative to a group of peers (Gómez, Priestley and Zapatero (2002) ). Finally, others have argued that the home bias in financial asset holdings is much smaller than often assumed because domestic financial assets may provide a natural hedge against idiosyncratic risk to domestic non-tradables, such as labour income (Engel and Matsumoto (2005) , Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) ).
Interestingly, although often mentioned and its relevance being widely acknowledged, the role of exchange rate volatility has received little attention in the empirical literature on home bias and trade in financial assets. To our knowledge, there is only one systematic analysis, by Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) , which develops an indirect test of the impact of domestic inflation risk in the absence of purchasing power parity (PPP). While they find that uncertain domestic inflation cannot rationalise the observed home bias, their test is based on an examination of the correlation between domestic equity returns and inflation, rather than an analysis of the impact of real exchange rate volatility on cross-border investment or home bias.
The composition of global bond portfolios has also received much less attention than equity holdings. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that the over USD 50 trillion outstanding global debt securities exceeds by far the around USD 35 trillion of world stock market capitalization. 1 There are two notable exceptions. First, Burger and Warnock (2003, 2004) look from a US perspective at foreign participation in local currency bond markets and the composition of US foreign bond portfolios. They find that sound macroe-conomic policies and institutions, such as creditor-friendly laws, attract foreign investment in local bond markets. Second, Lane (2005) shows that individual euro area economies' international bond holdings are biased towards intra-euro area holdings. Moreover, he finds that trade linkages and geographical proximity explain a considerable part of both intra-and extra-euro area bond holdings. These findings are broadly consistent with those of De and De Santis and Gérard (2006) , which confirm that the introduction of the euro affected portfolio allocation within the euro area.
The present paper takes a global perspective and focuses on the role of real exchange rate volatility as a key determinant of international portfolio allocation and home bias. The paper analyses the importance of real exchange rate volatility in explaining cross-country differences in home bias, and in particular as an explanation for differences in home bias across financial asset classes, i.e. between equities and bonds. We use a Markowitz-type international capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which incorporates real exchange rate volatility as stochastic deviations from PPP. Given a mean-variance optimisation which implies risk-aversion of investors, real exchange rate volatility induces a bias towards domestic financial assets because it puts additional risk on holding foreign securities from a domestic (currency) investors' perspective, unless foreign local currency real returns and the real exchange rate are sufficiently negatively correlated.
A second key implication of the model is that home bias in assets with relatively high local currency return volatility should respond less to real exchange rate volatility than home bias in assets with relatively low local currency return volatility. This result entails that in the presence of real exchange rate volatility home bias is generally higher for assets with lower local currency return volatility. The rationale is as follows: If return volatility of a foreign asset is low, real exchange rate volatility makes a relatively higher contribution to real return volatility of this asset, when measured in domestic currency, and vice versa. Overall, this implies that home bias should be higher for bonds than for equities as bond returns typically are less volatile than equity returns. It also means that a reduction of exchange rate volatility should have a larger impact on bond home biases than on equity home biases.
We take these hypotheses to the data and test for the role of real exchange rate volatility as a driver of bilateral equity and bond home biases for 40 investor countries, covering all major industrialised and emerging market economies, and up to 120 destination countries. We find compelling empirical support for both of our main hypotheses. First, real exchange rate volatility is an important explanation for the cross-country differences in bilateral home biases in bonds and in equities. Our benchmark model with real exchange rate volatility can explain around 20 percent of the cross-country variation in equity and bond home biases. The aim of the paper is to motivate and explore specifically the role of exchange rate volatility, rather than to examine the large set of factors that could explain home bias in general. Nevertheless, in testing the impact of real exchange rate volatility, we also control for a set of bilateral factors that are commonly used in the gravity literature on international trade in goods and assets. In addition, the bilateral dimension of our dependent and explanatory variables allows us to control for (investor and target) country fixed effects, i.e. for country-specific determinants when isolating the impact of real exchange rate volatility on home bias. Second, we find that bond home bias is more pronounced than equity home bias, although this stylised fact is not highly robust across country-pairs. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis of our Markowitz-type international CAPM that financial assets with lower underlying volatility should exhibit a larger home bias. More importantly, we show that a reduction of the monthly real exchange rate volatility from its sample mean to zero reduces bond home bias by around 60 percentage points, while it reduces the equity home bias by only 20 percentage points.
The findings of the paper have relevant implications from a number of perspectives. For the evolving literature on home bias, the results underline that exchange rate volatility is a key factor that needs be included and controlled for when modelling portfolio choices and home bias. For economic policy, the findings stress that uncertainty and risk-whether stemming from economic, political or other sources-may explain an important part of the pattern of global financial integration.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the literature on portfolio choice and home bias, drawing in particular on the factors that have been put forward to explain home bias. The data and some key stylised facts are presented in Section 3. Section 4 then develops a simple Markowitz-type international CAPM that links real exchange rate volatility, modelled as stochastic deviations from PPP, and portfolio choice. This model motivates the empirical analysis of Section 5, which outlines the results for explaining home bias and understanding the differences in equity and bond home biases. Section 6 concludes, briefly discussing also possible extensions and implications for policy.
Review of the literature
The work by French and Poterba (1991) showed that compared to simple benchmarks resulting from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) the fraction of wealth countries invest in foreign securities is much too low. In its simplest form the CAPM predicts that all investors hold the same portfolio of risky assets. The rationale is that if investors have identical expectations of the mean and variance of future returns of all securities and apply the same portfolio optimisation procedure, all investors will allocate their portfolio in the same way. In this case the share of each country in world market capitalisation has to equal the share by which each investor is invested in this country. For example, as the United States' stock market accounts for about 45 percent of world stock market capitalisation, the CAPM predicts that each single investor should invest around 45 percent of his equity wealth in the United States' stock market. However, the world outside the United States only invests 8 percent of its equity wealth in the United States. Similarly, US investors should invest 55 percent of their equity holdings in the rest of the world. US investors, however, hold only around 14 percent in foreign stocks. 2 It has been argued that the international CAPM as formulated by Solnik (1974) is subject to several assumptions which may not hold in global security markets. For example, the CAPM abstracts from transaction and information costs which may differ among investors and countries. Such costs tend to increase the price of foreign investment rel-ative to domestic investment and thereby lower returns on foreign investment. In their seminal paper, French and Poterba (1991) find that 98 percent of Japanese equity holdings are domestic, while 94 percent of US holdings and 82 percent of UK holdings are domestic. Assuming that investors optimise their portfolios according to Markowitz-type mean-variance portfolio selection, they extract from each country's perspective the expected returns implied by actual portfolio allocation and historical return covariances. The results suggest that investors expect considerably higher returns in their respective domestic markets, with Japanese investors, for example, exhibiting 300 basis points higher return expectations on the Japanese stock market than US investors have on the Japanese market. They conclude that taxes and transaction costs are unlikely to explain this large differential.
As transaction costs are difficult to measure, Tesar and Werner (1995) argue that the cost associated with transactions should be negatively related to the number of transactions undertaken in the market. However their empirical findings interestingly reveal that in the US and Canada the turnover rate on foreign equity is several times higher than on domestic equity. Warnock (2001) re-estimates the turnover rate based on stocks of foreign equity in these countries' portfolios. While the adjusted base of foreign holdings reduces the estimated turnover rate of foreign equity to that of domestic equity, this finding does not alter the general conclusion that transaction cost can explain only little of the home bias.
Information costs may also lower returns on foreign investment and increase the ex ante volatility of foreign investment returns. 3 Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) study the effect of both direct barriers, such as capital controls, and indirect barriers arising from informational asymmetries on foreign equity holdings of US investors in 48 countries. They show that information frictions, as proxied by the inverse of the fraction of companies from a foreign market cross-listed at a US stock exchange, significantly raise home bias. Moreover, using security-level data on investors' equity holdings in nine emerging markets, Edison and Warnock (2004) find that emerging market securities crosslisted on US stock exchanges are not underweighted in US portfolios, when accounting for closely-held stocks. Along the same line, Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2002) show that in explaining shares of emerging market securities in US portfolios, in fact only market capitalization net of closely-held stocks is significant, while total market capitalization has no additional explanatory power.
Another strand of the literature has focused on how geographical patterns impact investor home bias. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) find that mutual funds earn significantly higher returns on equities of companies' which are headquartered close to the mutual fund. Hau (2001) shows that German speaking investors earn excess returns on German equity, a finding that is confirmed also for other countries (e.g., Choe, Khoe and Stulz (2004) for Korea, Dvorak (2005) for Indonesia).
A related literature analyzes the impact of information frictions on international portfolio flows. Portes, Rey and Oh (2001, 2005) find that bilateral portfolio flows of the US depend negatively on distance, while they positively respond to the volume of bilateral telephone traffic. Interestingly, Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) show that more standardized assets like treasury bonds respond less to information frictions than corporate bonds or equity.
The general finding that transaction costs are less important than informational asymmetries in explaining foreign investment is also underlined by the empirical evidence on broader country samples, as provided by Bertraut and Kole (2004), Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) , Faruqee, Li and Yan (2004) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) . Most of the explanatory power in these papers comes from gravity-type variables such as distance or language. This pattern is also confirmed by one of the very few comprehensive studies of international bond portfolios by Lane (2005) , which concentrates on euro area bond holdings. Lane points out that a "basic reason is that the volume of trade is a good predictor of the level of bilateral exchange rate volatility". In addition to gravity-type information proxies, Burger and Warnock (2003, 2004) stress the importance of a low inflation record and creditor-friendly policies in attracting investment in local currency bond markets. Finally, Sørensen, Yosha, Wu and Zhu (2005) , show how the decline in home bias during the last decade has resulted in a substantial increase in risk-sharing between countries.
However, to our knowledge there exists no paper that explicitly and systematically analyses real exchange rate volatility as a determinant of bond and equity home bias in a global context. The study by Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) mentioned in the introduction develops an indirect test of whether the home bias in equity portfolios is caused by investors trying to hedge inflation risk. This is found to be the case only if investors have very low risk aversion and equity returns are negatively correlated with domestic inflation. However, their indirect test is based on an examination of the correlation between domestic equity returns and inflation, rather than an analysis of the impact of real exchange rate volatility on cross-border investment or home bias.
Data and stylised facts relating to global equity and bond markets
This section first discusses the data and definitions of home bias and presents a number of characteristics and interesting stylized facts about home biases in global equity and bond markets. These are used as motivation for the model and empirical estimation in subsequent sections.
Data and definitions
Data on global equity and bond holdings are taken from the International Monetary Fund's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) for the years 1997, 2001, 2002 and 2003. 4 In this survey, the up to 70 reporting countries and regions 5 provide information about their foreign portfolio investment assets. Portfolio investment is broken down by instruments (equity and debt) and residence of issuer, the latter providing information about the destination of portfolio investment. Debt instruments are partly broken down by long-term debt and short-term debt, with the latter being defined as debt securities with an original maturity of up to one year. 6 While the CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings, it is still subject to a number of important caveats. Most importantly, the CPIS is not able to address the issue of third-country holdings and round-tripping. For example, German equity investment alone in Luxembourg was reported to be USD 152 billion in 2003, when Luxembourg's stock market capitalisation was less than USD 40 billion. A similar point can be made for Ireland and several smaller financial offshore centres. Moreover, the CPIS data show a very low degree of cross-border holdings by emerging market economies. In the absence of other financial data especially for this country group, it is difficult to check whether this reflects reality or is due to reporting omissions. Finally, the CPIS does not provide a currency breakdown and does not identify domestic security holdings. 7 Therefore, in order to derive the domestic component of each country's portfolio, we take the aggregate of portfolio investment in that country as reported by the remaining countries as an estimate of the country's liabilities. 8 The difference of reported liabilities and local market capitalization gives an estimate of the domestic component of the countries' portfolios. Stock market capitalisation is taken from Standard and Poor's (2004) . Bond market capitalization is proxied by the amounts outstanding published in the Bank for International Settlements Security Statistics Tables 14 and 16 containing data on international debt securities by residence of issuer and domestic debt securities by residence of issuer of all maturities and sectors. 9 It has to be noted that due to the above mentioned caveats of the CPIS we exclude some countries from our analysis, in particular financial centres such as Ireland and Luxembourg, for which data seem distorted. The remaining countries in our sample together account for over 90 percent of global equity and bond market capitalization.
In order to derive a measure of home bias we compare actual geographical portfolio allocations to those predicted by a simple benchmark. We follow the literature and take the share of a country's market capitalization in the world market as a benchmark (see e.g. Chan, Covrig and Ng, 2005) . In this context, home bias measures the degree to 5 In the following we refer to the participating territorial entities as countries throughout, irrespective of whether they constitute sovereign states or not.
6 Not all countries provide a breakdown of debt securities by maturity. However, they report the total value of debt securities 7 For a detailed discussion of the CPIS, see International Monetary Fund (2002) . 8 Thus we make the implicit assumption that non-reporting countries do not have any portfolio investment in the reporting countries.
9 Note that we cannot identify amounts outstanding of debt securities by original maturity, as the BIS only provides a separate breakdown for debt securities with remaining maturity of up to one year. which investors of a given country are overweight in domestic assets and underweight in international assets, as compared to the benchmark portfolio that would weigh home and foreign assets according to the respective shares in the global financial market.
Formally, let w * i be the market weight of the rest of the world seen from the viewpoint of a given country i, and w i be the share of international assets in the country's portfolio, home bias is given by the percent difference between these two weights:
For example, if country i investors allocate w i = 25 percent of their portfolio abroad, whereas w * i = 75 percent of the world's market capitalization are abroad, they have only exploited international diversification to one-third and thus have a home bias of two-thirds.
More specifically, we can determine a "bilateral" home bias between two countries and gauge how much the actual allocation of financial assets of country i vis-à-vis any given country j differs from the benchmark weight this country should receive:
This measure states how underweight or overweight investors of country i are in a given country j, by providing the percentage deviation of the actual portfolio from the market portfolio. In the market portfolio with full international diversification w ij equals w * j and the home bias is zero; at the other extreme, if investors of country i do not hold any securities of country j, they are said to have a home bias of 100 percent against that country. Of course, this measure also allows a country to be overinvested in other countries, as is the case among some euro area countries, in which case the home bias becomes negative.
Key stylised facts
Global stock and bond markets are heavily concentrated in mature economies that account for 83 percent of world stock market capitalization and 92 percent of the outstanding amount of debt securities. Reporting emerging economies contribute a much smaller share of 6 and 3 percent to the global market capitalization of equities and bonds. 10 It is worth noting that the US plays an even more dominant role in global equity markets than in global bond markets, since for both the euro area and Japan the weight in bond markets is roughly 50 percent higher than in stock markets. Within emerging markets, Asia is relatively more important for stock markets, whereas Latin America plays a larger role in bond markets. All these differences reflect in particular the relative size of public debt in the various areas and regions. Table 1 10 Note that for the descriptive analysis we group those countries that do not report to the CPIS as "Rest of the world". This group includes both mature and emerging economies.
The allocation of equity and bond portfolios across the world is reported in Tables 2  and 3 . Regarding the allocation of global equity portfolios, two stylized facts are worth noting. First, all economies attach high weights to local equity. These range from between 70 and 80 percent for the United Kingdom and individual euro area countries to over 90 percent in the case of reporting emerging economies (see main diagonal of Table 3 ). Also US investors allocate more than 85 percent of their portfolios to domestic equity, and for Japan this share is as high as 90 percent. Second, intra-euro area and intra-European integration explains the relatively high degree of foreign portfolio investment of euro area economies. This is also reflected in the fact that taking the euro area as a single country, the share of domestic equity in its portfolio increases to 84 percent (roughly ten percentage points more than for individual euro area countries), a figure broadly comparable to that of the United States. Tables 2-3 Two further interesting findings can be made from the comparison of the geographical allocation of equity portfolios with that of bond portfolios. For the two major issuers of debt securities, the United States and the euro area (42 and 25 percent of world market capitalization) the weights attached to domestic debt securities increase substantially compared to the case of equities. However, the composition of individual euro area economies' portfolios shows that at the disaggregate level these are significantly more international, reflecting substantial cross-border holdings within the euro area. Table 4 The results for the overall measure of home bias, that provides an intuition of the degree to which portfolios are sub-optimally diversified, are summarized in Table 4 . First, mature economies have a relatively higher bias towards domestic debt securities than towards domestic equities, of on average 73 and 68 percent, respectively. Second, this finding is particularly strong for the United States, with bond home bias of 91 percent against an equity home bias of 75 percent, while the euro area as an aggregate, as well as individual euro area economies have lower home bias in both markets. Tables 5-6 This finding is consistent with the results on bilateral home bias shown in Tables 5  and 6 for equity and bonds, respectively. Home bias between euro area economies isespecially in bond markets-in most of the cases below 50 percent. This implies that euro area economies attach a portfolio weight to other euro area economies' securities, which is at least half the benchmark weight. In addition, the broader trends as described above are confirmed by the examination of the bilateral home bias measures. In particular, emerging economies fail to diversify their portfolios while at the same time they hardly attract portfolio investment.
Figure 1
Finally Figure 1 shows how home bias has steadily declined over recent years. In particular, the euro area has-with the implementation of the monetary union-eliminated the gap between bond and equity home bias. While the look at broader patterns confirms the finding that home bias is more pronounced in bond markets, this stylized fact does not hold for emerging economies. However, this could be largely due to measurement problems and the above mentioned caveats of the CPIS.
4 Theoretical framework: equity and bond home bias in the absence of PPP This section presents a simple theoretical framework that links stochastic deviations from PPP, or real exchange rate volatility, with home bias. In addition to the well-known fact that exchange rate risk tends to reduce the optimal weight of foreign securities in investors' portfolios, we show that this effect decreases in the domestic currency return volatility of assets. In order keep the model manageable we impose a simple stochastic structure for asset returns. We assume that the nominal (local currency) rate of return i D k and real (local currency) rate of return r D k of a domestic asset k are given by the following equations, where µ k is a constant (which is equal to the expected real rate of return) and
Note that this specification implies that domestic assets are a perfect hedge against inflation, as long as inflation and the random shock to the return are uncorrelated. However, this assumption is only made for notational convenience, since dropping π D from (3) and (4) would not alter the general findings. 11
In order to express returns earned on foreign securities in real local currency terms, we assume a stochastic relative purchasing power parity, where ∆ ln e stands for a variation (where an increase corresponds to a depreciation) of the domestic currency, π D and π F are the domestic and foreign inflation rate and η is an error term with E(η) = 0 and
Note that if relative purchasing power parity were to hold perfectly (V ar(η) = 0), the inflation differential alone would determine the path of the nominal exchange rate, with higher domestic inflation deterministically resulting in a depreciation, as predicted by purchasing power parity.
11 We thank Philipp Hartmann for noting that while for equities the assumption of inflation hedged real returns may hold, this assumption is particularly unrealistic for bonds. However, our results do not change substantially if this assumption is relaxed for bonds while being maintained for equities or vice versa.
Foreign currency nominal returns of foreign securities are given by equation (6) below. Correspondingly-using equation (3), (4) and (6)-domestic currency real returns of foreign securities are given by equation (7). Superscripts D and F denote domestic and foreign variables, respectively:
Equation (7) is a key equation in this context. It shows that in our specification, the real return of foreign securities expressed in domestic currency depends not only on the shock to the return of the foreign security, but also on a shock measuring the deviation of the exchange rate from relative PPP, η. This implies that any deviation of the exchange rate from purchasing power parity drives a wedge between real returns on domestic and foreign investment.
To further simplify the analysis, we assume that the global capital market consist of two countries, each of which offers one equity and one bond, denoted by the subscripts e and b. Then, according to equations (4) and (7), expected real returns in domestic currency are given by:
Note that from equations (3) and (4) we have restricted expected local currency real returns to be identical within asset classes, irrespective of whether they are domestic or foreign securities. We also assume for simplicity that variances of nominal returns are identical within asset classes. Furthermore all errors are assumed to be uncorrelated. 12 In this case, the variance-covariance matrix of domestic currency real returns is given by:
Given these assumptions on returns and volatilities of the four securities, we can use simple portfolio selection to derive optimal portfolio weights and eventually a measure of home bias. In this respect, we follow Adler and Dumas (1985) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) taking a standard Markowitz mean-variance investor who maximises a quadratic utility function, where E(R P F ) is the expected real return on a portfolio of risky assets, V ar(R P F ) is the squared standard deviation of returns and λ is the coefficient of risk aversion or relative weight attached to the volatility of the return: 13
The investor chooses the optimal portfolio weights w for all individual assets in the portfolio, with respect to a vector of expected real returns E(R) of the individual assets, the variance-covariance matrix Σ of real returns, which is assumed to be known, and a unity investment restriction. The resulting optimisation problem is given by the following Lagrangian, with µ being a Lagrange multiplier:
Derivation of equation (11) with respect to w yields the optimal portfolio weights:
For notational convenience we define the following portfolio constant:
Substituting (8), (9) and (13) into (12) yields the portfolio weights of domestic equity and bonds, as well as foreign equity and bonds, as follows:
Defining P D as the domestic fraction of world portfolio wealth, market clearing requires the world market portfolio w * to be:
Using the identity P F = 1 − P D substitution of equation (14) into equation (15) yields an expression for equity home bias, HB e , and bond home bias, HB b , defined as the deviation of the weight of foreign equities (bonds) in the domestic portfolio from the weight the foreign equity (bond) market has in the world market.
Note, that the advantage of these expressions derived from our model is that they exactly match the definition of home bias employed in the empirical literature. The model gives rise to several postulates that can be tested empirically:
First, equations (16) and (17) state that home bias increases in real exchange rate volatility, which measures the degree to which relative PPP is violated. If the change in the real exchange rate equals the inflation differential, i.e. relative PPP perfectly holds, home bias is zero. Conversely, as real exchange rate risk increases to infinity, home bias converges to unity, which implies the absence of foreign investment.
Second, home bias decreases in the relative value of a country's portfolio, P D . This reflects the intuitive feature that large global players can "afford" a relatively large home weight without necessarily showing a home "bias".
Third, home bias decreases in the (common) local currency variance of the equity or bond. This means that the higher is the volatility of the local currency return, the less important will be the impact of exchange rate volatility on volatility expressed in domestic currency and the less the risk-return profile of a foreign security will be affected by real exchange rate risk. If exchange rate volatility converges to zero, the risk-return profile of a foreign security is dominated by its idiosyncratic risk component. The latter postulate implies that as long the local currency volatility of bond returns is smaller than that of equity returns, home bias is higher in global bond markets than in global stock markets. These postulates are tested below.
Empirical results
We now turn to the empirical framework and results. Section 5.1 formulates equations (16)-(17) in a structural form, which can be tested empirically for our broad cross-section of countries. Extension and robustness tests of these benchmark results follow in Section 5.2. Finally, Section 5.3 presents and discusses in detail the marginal effects of real exchange rate volatility for equity and bond home biases, illustrating the empirical relevance of real exchange rate volatility for explaining today's existing portfolio home bias.
Benchmark model and results
The main objective is to estimate the effect of real exchange rate volatility on cross-country differences in bilateral home bias. Moreover, we want to understand the differential effects of exchange rate volatility on bilateral home bias across financial assets, i.e. between equities and bonds.
Recall from Section 3 the definition of the bilateral home bias of an investor country i vis-à-vis the destination country j:
with w * j as the world market share of country j and w ij as the share of country i's portfolio held in country j securities. One potential complication is that in the case of w * j < w ij , which implies an overinvestment of country i in country j, the measure of home bias can take large negative values if w * j is small. Thus we re-define the home bias measure for these cases as:
Note that in case of relatively small underinvestment or overinvestment definitions equations (18) and (19) are roughly equal as both are approximately:
The rationale for using this simplification of equation (18) for overweight investment is to reduce large negative outliers in the estimation results. It is important to note that there are only very few cases in which countries are overweight internationally in their investment, and such overinvestment is generally small in all cases. Moreover, the empirical findings below do not change in a meaningful manner when using equation (18) throughout.
Since the dependent variable for home bias is restricted to lie between -1 and 1 we use a tobit estimator for censored variables. Therefore we modify equations (16) and (17) As tobit estimation requires a linear representation of the latent variable, we modify equations (16) and (17) as:
with σ ηij being the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly bilateral real exchange rate changes over the period 1998-2005 and ln P D the logarithm of the proportion of country i's wealth in world wealth. 14 We chose and tested various different proxies for real exchange rate volatility. Ideally one would like to have a proxy that is forwardlooking and reflects the expectations of investors concerning this source of uncertainty. In the absence of such a forward-looking measure, we take the standard deviation of monthly real exchange rate changes over the period 1998-2005 as our preferred measure of volatility. However, we have tested various alternative measures of real exchange rate volatility using a broad range of different historical periods. Since the estimated standard deviations do not vary significantly over the different periods, our empirical results are robust to using such alternative proxies. Since the time dimension of the data is limited and, moreover, changes over time are very small and mainly reflect valuation changes rather than cross-border investment flows we use averaged data over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] and thus estimate a pure cross-section.
14 For a detailed description of variable definitions and sources, see Appendix A.
Most importantly, we use a fixed effects estimator. Although non-linear models with fixed effects tend to yield biased estimators, Greene (2001) shows that this bias in practice is negligibly small in practice and is outweighed by the advantage of more precise estimates for the standard errors. Our preferred estimator is therefore one that includes source and host country fixed effects, as these country specific fixed effects are able to control for virtually all (source and host) country specific determinants of home bias, e.g. the existence of capital controls, macroeconomic stability, or institutional quality in both source and host countries. However, as a robustness check we also present results for pooled and random effects estimators. Table 7 provides the results for the benchmark model, using a source and host countryfixed effects estimator, separately for equity and for bond home bias. This estimator also corrects for a potential correlation of the residuals across observations by estimating cluster-corrected standard errors. A key result is that real exchange rate volatility has a sizeable and highly significant effect on home bias. Moreover, the effect of real exchange rate volatility is much larger on home bias in bonds than equity home bias. In fact the point estimate for the former is in some specifications more than twice as large as the latter. The tobit estimator does not allow us to interpret the coefficients in a meaningful way, but we will return to this specific issue in Section 5.3. Table 7 More specifically, Table 7 shows the empirical findings for seven alternative model specifications. In these various specifications we attempt to control for different potential sources of home bias, other than real exchange rate volatility, that have been stressed in the literature-namely related to information costs and asymmetries (model II), hedging against terms of trade shocks (model III), non-linear effects of exchange rate volatility (model IV), portfolio diversification opportunities (model V) and risk-sharing (models VI and VII). The key objective of these alternative specifications is to test whether real exchange rate volatility continues to be a significant determinant of home bias even when controlling for these alternative hypotheses.
Model I includes only real exchange rate volatility while model II adds gravity variables as controls. As we know from the literature on gravity models, as discussed in Section 3, distance and other familiarity variables are often found to be good proxies for transaction and information costs and asymmetries. Indeed, the size of the point estimate for the real exchange rate volatility variable falls when controlling for gravity factors. The fact that the real exchange rate volatility coefficient for equity home bias declines relatively more strongly suggests that such information costs may play a larger role for equities than for bonds.
As a next step, model (III) adds bilateral imports of country i from country j to the specification. The rationale for including trade follows the argument by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001)-tested thoroughly in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) and Lane (2005) that bilateral financial asset holdings may function as a hedging device against terms of trade shocks in partner countries. For instance, country i can insure itself against price changes in imports from country j by purchasing financial assets in country j. A rise in import prices and a corresponding increase in earnings, and thus higher equity returns, in country j should therefore have offsetting effects for the wealth of country i.
In our case this means that more imports from country j should lower the home bias country i has vis-à-vis country j. We find that while this trade variable has the correct negative sign, it is not statistically significant in the fixed effects estimation, though it is in some specifications for the pooled estimator (Table 8 ) and the random effects estimator (Table 9 ). Moreover, the finding that higher bilateral import intensity is significantly negatively related to home bias in equities but not in bonds for these latter two estimators is also sensible because it suggests that equity securities provide a better hedge against such terms of trade shocks than bonds, which usually pay a fixed coupon.
Model IV tests for non-linearities in the effects of real exchange rate volatility on home bias. One hypothesis is that changes in real exchange rate volatility may have e.g. a more important effect on financial asset holdings and home bias when such volatility is very low. For instance, De Santis (2005) and De Santis and Gérard (2006) argue that the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe may have affected the size of cross-border financial investment.
We tested various specifications for non-linearities in real exchange rate volatility, and show in model IV of Table 5 the one with the strongest results, namely when including a currency union dummy if both countries i and j share a common currency. This specification suggests that there are indeed non-linear effects in that currency unions reduce the home biases in bonds and in equities substantially, in addition to the effect that currency unions have on real exchange rate volatility. Nevertheless, even when controlling for currency unions the effect of real exchange rate volatility on bond home bias remains substantially larger than that for equities. Moreover, as there is a strong correlation between real exchange rate volatility and the currency union dummy, our preferred model specification is to continue focusing on the real exchange rate volatility variable.
Models V and VI attempt to control for diversification opportunities and risk-sharing. As discussed in Section 3 above, in a mean-variance portfolio choice model, there is no rationale for an investor to invest in foreign assets in countries where their returns are strongly positively correlated with domestic financial assets as this does not allow the investor to diversify her risk. Hence home bias in bilateral asset holdings should be larger across those country pairs where asset returns are strongly positively correlated. Tables 8-9 We test this hypothesis in two different ways, one by including monthly bilateral stock correlations (model V) and another one by including quarterly GDP correlations (model VI). One of these variables is found to be significant for the fixed effects estimator of Table 5 , although they become partly significant when using pooled and random effects estimators as shown in Tables 8 and 9 .
After controlling for and investigating the role of various alternative economic factors, we now turn to the different econometric estimators. Tables 8 and 9 show the findings for the same economic models using a pooled estimator and a random effects estimator, respectively. Most importantly, the coefficient estimates for the real exchange rate volatil-ity variable are very similar for these estimators, thus confirming the robustness of our findings.
Moreover, there are some additional interesting results emerging from these alternative estimators. These mostly relate to the fact that we find far more statistically significant coefficients among the gravity variables and the other factors than in the fixed effects model. As discussed above, imports become statistically significant in many pooled and random effects models. Also several of the gravity and risk-sharing controls now come out significantly. In addition, the McKelvey-Zavoina-Pseudo-R 2 of the pooled model gives an indication of the goodness of fit of the model and the overall impact of real exchange rate volatility and shows that a sizeable 20 percent of the cross-country variation in home biases can be explained by the benchmark model with real exchange rate volatility alone. 15 However, we do not wish to over-interpret these additional findings as our preferred estimator is the fixed effects model as it controls in the best possible way for all unobservable source and host country effects. Table 10 A final note refers to the formal test of equality of the effects of the independent variables on bond home bias versus equity home bias. As this test cannot be conducted in the fixed effects tobit model of Table 7 , we estimate a fixed effect seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) for bond home bias and equity home bias simultaneously. Table 10 shows that the coefficients (which are in fact ordinary least square estimators) and standard errors are very similar to those of the tobit estimator. The tests of equality indeed confirm that in particular the effect of real exchange rate volatility is statistically significantly larger on home bias than on home bias in equity securities.
In summary, we find compelling evidence that real exchange rate volatility has a sizeable and highly significant effect on bilateral home bias both in bonds and in equities. More importantly, the results provide strong support for our hypothesis formulated through the portfolio selection model specification of Section 4 in that bilateral home biases in bonds are significantly more sensitive to real exchange rate volatility than those in equity securities. This holds across all the various economic model specifications as well as the different econometric estimators. In fact, the difference in the effect of real exchange rate volatility on home bias in bonds versus home bias in equities becomes in most instances even stronger when controlling for various other determinants, such as information asymmetries, trade and risk-sharing.
Extensions and robustness
There are many factors that are likely to affect home bias and cross-border investment. While we have tried to control for a broad set of determinants in Section 5.1, there are two more specific points that we are trying to tackle in this subsection to further buttress the robustness of our findings. The first relates to the potential caveat that it could be a broader notion of uncertainty, and not only the exchange rate uncertainty alone, that causes portfolio home bias and drives a wedge between home bias in equities and in bonds. The second relates to the potential caveat that the country selection could matter, in particular the joint assessment of developed and developing countries. We tackle these points in turn.
To assess the first potential caveat that other factors, which make financial returns on foreign asset uncertain, could be equally important as the exchange rate, we analyse whether various other forms of risk, such as related to political and institutional factors in host countries, affect home bias. For this purpose, we take our benchmark model III and add various institutional and political variables that have been stressed in the literature as relevant factors in influencing cross-border investment (see Appendix A), always also controlling for real exchange rate volatility. One caveat is that we cannot use our otherwise preferred fixed effects estimator, as this would not allow us to include variables that are specific to the host country. Hence we use here the pooled estimator of Table 6 . Table 11   Table 11 shows the empirical findings when adding various political, institutional and other controls to the benchmark model III. All of these variables are scaled so that a higher value implies better institutions. As one would expect, countries have a lower home bias vis-à-vis countries that have better institutions. This is in particular the case for bond home bias for which all seven institutional variables are statistically significant. Equally importantly, in most cases the impact of the proxies is substantially larger on bond home bias than on equity home bias.
These results confirm the implications of our portfolio selection model in demonstrating that uncertainty has a larger impact on international bond investment than on equity investment. They also confirm that real exchange rate volatility remains relevant and significant, with its effect on equity and bond home bias being largely unchanged.
To assess the second potential caveat regarding country selection, we check whether the findings of Section 5.1 are robust to using alternative country samples, as it could be that exchange rate uncertainty plays a role only for those countries where hedging is not possible or highly costly. We therefore in particular make a distinction between industrialised countries and developing economies. Table 12   Table 12 shows the results for three alternative groupings using a fixed effects estimator as in Section 5.1. The key finding is that real exchange rate volatility is a significant determinant of equity and bond home bias for all country groupings, including when only looking at mature economies as source and host countries (the first set of columns in Table 10 ). The coefficient for exchange rate volatility is somewhat higher when estimating a sample with only developing economies as host countries. Also the results for the gravity variables are comparable across samples.
In summary, this subsection confirms the robustness and the significant role of real exchange rate volatility as a determinant of portfolio home bias. It also holds when extending the model to control for various other types of uncertainties and institutional variables, and when looking at alternative country samples.
Marginal effect of real exchange rate volatility
As the final step of our analysis, we now turn to discussing the overall role of real exchange rate volatility for home bias in equities and bonds. How much of the existing home bias across a country pair can be accounted for by this variable? And what would a change in exchange rate volatility imply for home bias in equities and in bonds? Figure 2 plots the distribution of bilateral real exchange rate volatilities over the period 1998-2005. The sample mean of 0.0398 implies an average of monthly real exchange rate changes between economies in our sample of 3.89 percent. The lower quantile nearly entirely represents euro area economy pairs and countries which peg to the US dollar or the euro. For these country pairs, bilateral real exchange rate volatility is equivalent to volatility of bilateral inflation differentials. For example, intra euro area real exchange rate volatility is around 0.2 percent for most country pairs and real exchange rate volatility between Hong Kong and the US is 0.5 percent over the sample period. Interestingly, real exchange rate volatility between the United States and the euro area is well below the sample mean at around 2.8 percent. Not surprisingly, real exchange rate volatility is particularly high vis-à-vis emerging market economies. For example, euro area real exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis Brazil and Indonesia is 7.1 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively. Two difficulties have to be addressed when assessing the marginal effect of real exchange rate volatility on home bias. First, our preferred tobit estimator is non-linear implying non-constant marginal effects of the independent variables. However, the relatively low degree of censoring in our sample would in practice allow for a direct interpretation of the estimated coefficients as marginal effects. This is also confirmed by a comparison of the coefficients from the tobit model with those of the (linear) SUR model which are strikingly similar.
A second difficulty arises from the fact that the independent variable of interest itself, real exchange rate volatility, enters the model in a non-linear form as we use the natural logarithm of this variable.
Therefore and in order to allow for a more intuitive assessment, we compute predicted values for equity and bond home bias for different values of real exchange rate volatility holding all other variables constant at their sample mean. Figure 3 plots the percentage point change in home bias in response to a departure of real exchange rate volatility from its sample mean holding all other variables constant at their respective mean values. The figure shows that in model III (which controls for imports and gravity) a reduction of real exchange rate volatility from its sample mean to close to zero implies a reduction of bond home bias by 60 percentage points, while it reduces equity home bias by only 20 percentage points.
The second plot of Figure 3 shows the marginal effects for model VII, which controls not only for imports and gravity, but also for real integration (proxied by GDP correlation) and diversification opportunities (proxied via past stock market correlations). The figure shows that the marginal effects of real exchange rate volatility are hardly changed in this model compared to our preferred benchmark model III: the elimination of real exchange rate volatility, as compared to the mean, still reduces bond home bias by 50 percent and equity home bias by about 20 percent.
In summary, the key point that emerges from this analysis of the marginal effects is that exchange rate volatility is an overall large and significant driver of home bias. This is in particular the case for bond home bias, and to a lesser extent for home bias in equity securities.
Conclusions
Much work has been done in recent years on understanding cross-border capital flows and explaining home bias. The primary focus in this literature has been on the importance of information frictions, transaction costs, corporate governance and institutions as well as the role of non-tradables for portfolio choices. Much less systematic attention has been given to the importance of exchange rate volatility and uncertainty.
The paper has analysed the role of real exchange rate volatility as a driver of home bias. First, it has focused on the importance of real exchange rate volatility in explaining cross-country differences in portfolio home bias. And second, the paper specifically has asked to what extent exchange rate volatility can account for differences in home bias across financial asset classes, i.e. between equities and bonds. To conduct this analysis, the paper has developed a simple portfolio selection model based on an international capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which incorporates real exchange rate volatility as stochastic deviations from PPP. Given a mean-variance optimisation which implies riskaversion of investors, real exchange rate volatility in this model induces a bias towards domestic financial assets because it puts additional risk on holding foreign securities from a domestic (currency) investors' perspective.
The key insight of the model is that the home bias in those assets with relatively high local currency return volatility responds less to real exchange rate volatility than home bias in assets with relatively low local currency return volatility. This result implies that in the presence of real exchange rate volatility home bias is generally higher for assets with lower local currency return volatility. The rationale is that if return volatility of a foreign asset is low, real exchange rate volatility makes a relatively higher contribution to real return volatility of this asset, when measured in domestic currency, and vice versa. Overall, this entails that home bias should be higher for bonds than for equities as bond returns typically are less volatile than equity returns. It also means that a change of real exchange rate volatility should have a larger impact on bond home biases than on equity home biases.
The paper has tested these hypotheses empirically for 40 investor countries, covering all major industrialised and emerging market economies, and up to 120 destination countries. Overall, we find strong empirical support for both of our hypotheses. First, real exchange rate volatility is an important explanation for the cross-country differences in bilateral home biases in bonds and in equities. Our benchmark model with real exchange rate volatility can explain about 20 percent of the cross-country variation in equity and bond home biases. Second, we find that bond home bias is somewhat more pronounced than equity home bias. More importantly, we show that a reduction of the monthly real exchange rate volatility from its sample mean to zero reduces bond home bias by up to 60 percentage points, while it reduces the equity home bias by only 20 percentage points. These findings underline the overall importance of real exchange rate volatility as a driver of portfolio home bias.
Finally, we conduct a number of extensions and robustness tests and find that these results are quite robust to controlling for a broad set of bilateral factors as commonly used in the gravity literature on international trade in goods and financial assets. In addition, the bilateral dimension of our dependent and explanatory variables allows us to control for (investor and target) country fixed effects, i.e. for country specific determinants when trying to isolate the impact of real exchange rate volatility on home bias.
The findings of the paper have relevant implications from a number of perspectives. For the evolving literature on home bias, the results underline that exchange rate volatility is an important factor that needs be included and controlled for when modelling portfolio choices and home bias. For economic policy, the role of exchange rate volatility in explaining portfolio home bias is important, as it introduces a macroeconomic policy dimension into the considerations of international financial integration. This extends the findings of the literature that have so far mostly focused on issues such as information costs, transaction costs and governance. The importance of the exchange rate underscores the rationale for overall macroeconomic and monetary stability. This would be consistent with the general finding of the paper that uncertainty and risk-whether stemming from economic, political or other sources-may explain continued elevated levels of home bias in global financial integration. Likewise, the progress towards global monetary stability made in recent years may well be an important factor in understanding the gradual increase in the internationalisation of portfolios currently observed.
However, the role of the exchange rate in this context also shows that financial integration in today's world of flexible exchange rates among major currencies may be more challenging for financial actors than during the so-called golden era of globalisation in the early 20 th century that was characterised by the gold standard. It could be an interesting policy issue to explore whether the move towards inflation targeting-and hence, floating exchange rates-in many industrial economies and increasingly also emerging market economies indeed entails a potential costs for financial integration, at least insofar as it may have raised exchange rate volatility in the short term. Likewise, an interesting policy angle could be to ask whether exchange rate stability is an important consideration underlying the still not well-understood net capital flows from emerging market economies to some industrialised countries, especially the United States, and whether the dollar-orientation of many exchange rate policies of such countries plays an important role. Notes: Home bias defined as percentage deviation of actual weight of equities of a foreign country in each investor country's portfolio from benchmark weight of the foreign country's equities, which is their share in the world market. A negative home bias indicates "overinvestment" of the investor country in the foreign country. Countries and regions include all CPIS reporting economies. Non-reporting economies are grouped in ROW. For details on the country sample see appendix A.
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33 Notes: Home bias defined as percentage deviation of actual weight of debt securities of a foreign country in each investor country's portfolio from benchmark weight of the foreign country's debt securities, which is their share of the world outstanding amount. A negative home bias indicates "overinvestment" of the investor country in the foreign country. Countries and regions include all CPIS reporting economies. Non-reporting economies are grouped in ROW. For details on the country sample see appendix A. Notes: The estimated model is that of equation (21) Notes: The estimated model is that of equation (21) Notes: The estimated model is that of equation (21) Notes: The estimated model is that of equation (21) implies that lnP i cannot be included in this model specification, adding a vector of controls X ij . R 2 is the coefficient of determination. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level is denoted by ***, **, * respectively. χ 2 is the test statistic for equality of the respective coefficients in the equity and bond home bias regressions. P-values are given in brackets. Notes: The estimated model is that of equation (21) , adding the vectors of controls from models III, IV, and VII. Lines cross at the sample mean of real exchange rate volatility and indicate by how many percentage points home bias changes in response to a change of real exchange rate volatility with respect to its sample mean, holding all other variables constant at their respective sample mean values.
